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STOLEN FREEDOMS: ARABS, MUSLIMS, AND SOUTH
ASIANS IN THE WAKE OF POST 9/11 BACKLASH
DALIA HASHAD t

Since 9/11, the United States government's "War on Terror" has, in
large part, been an attack on innocent Arabs, people from the Middle
East and South Asia, and Muslims. Using race, ethnicity and religion as a
proxy for criminal behavior, law enforcement has zeroed in on people of
certain ethnicities and a single faith. The Department of Justice (DOJ),
now engulfed in the Department of Homeland Security, has rolled out
programs and established policies that target, harass and in many instances, make life miserable for Arabs and Muslims in this country. The
overwhelming majority in these groups are innocent of any criminal activity, however their persecution by zealous law enforcement results in
thousands of needless tragedies. For every day that has passed since
9/11, there are dozens of painful stories borne of government-instituted
discrimination and racist implementation of policy.
I. SALMAN HAMDANI
One of my favorite stories is incredibly painful. It speaks volumes
about American law enforcement's willingness to blindly approach the
"War on Terror" by using the failed tools of ethnic and religious profiling. On the morning of September l1th, 2001, Mohammed Salman
Hamdani, a 23 year-old Pakistani Muslim left his home in Bayside,
Queens, a borough of New York City.1 "Salman," as he was known, was
headed toward his new job as a lab technician in Rockefeller Center,
right in the middle of Manhattan. 23 He'd been there just a month.3 A
sports enthusiast, a Star Wars fan, an excellent student who aspired to be
a doctor, he was a beloved son, brother and friend.4 The last hours of his
life tell you something about his character. He had stayed up late on September 10th, working on an application for medical school and tending to
his father, who had a history of heart problems.5 Salman sat up with him
until 2:30 in the morning, checking his blood pressure and taking his
pulse.6 A remarkable young man, he had worked as a police cadet and a
f
The Arab, Muslin, South Asian Advocate for the American Civil Liberties Union's Campaign Against Racial Profiling. B.A in Environmental Policy, University of California at Berkeley;
J.D., New York University School of Law. This speech was originally presented at a symposium on
March 5, 2004.
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part time ambulance rider.7 He was a first responder, trained to be first on
the scene of an accident. Indeed, he took his training, experience and the
values of assisting people in need so seriously that the previous summer,
on a road trip with his father, he insisted on stopping to help people
pulled over on the side of the road. 8 Generosity of spirit and service extended to all aspects of Salman's life. His brother likes to tell of how he
would drop a $20 bill near a homeless person so that they would not have
to suffer the indignity of asking. 9 By all accounts, Salman was a charitable and kind-hearted person.
Judging by the time he had left the house, Salman should have been
somewhere on the number seven subway line, an elevated train that connects Queens, a New York City borough, to Manhattan. 10 He should have
been far from the chaos of the downtown disaster and maybe even in a
position to view the smoke and devastation at the World Trade Center.1
Knowing her son's generous nature, his mother Talat Hamdani worried
that he might have gone down to the World Trade Center to help. 12 The
Hamdanis did not sleep that night, waiting for their son who never came
home. The next day, family gathered at the Hamdani household and created a flyer like so many thousands of other New York families that day,
posting it throughout the city and searching for anyone who might have
seen him. 13 A picture of Salman wearing a tie and a big smile stood right
above the word "MISSING."
The Hamdani family spread out to the local area hospitals, and plastered the flier all over New York City, hoping that someone, somewhere,
could help them find Salman.14 Nothing resulted. 5 Then one day, members of the press from the New York Post, New York Daily News, and
Newsday showed up at their front door, telling Salman's parents that the
government had created their own flier.' 6 They too were looking for
Salman who was "wanted for questioning" in connection with the 9/11
terrorist attacks.' 7 The flier was being distributed among police stations.18 There was a big picture of Salman, indicating that he was 23
years old, Pakistani, Muslim, and last seen on the morning of September
11th; but this one didn't say "MISSING." Reporters contacted the Ham7.
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id/3068112 (last visited May 25, 2004) [hereinafter FirstPerson].
13.
Shane, supra note 1, at 3G.
14.
Id.
15.
See id.
16.
FirstPerson, supranote 12.
17.
Shane, supra note 1, at 3G.
18.
FirstPerson, supranote 12.

2004]

STOLEN FREEDOMS

dani family about the flyer.' 9 The New York Post Headline on October
12, 2001, read "Missing - or Hiding?, 20 The New York Times reported
that the New York Police Department (NYPD) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) were looking for Salman. 21 And indeed they were.
The FBI started harassing the Hamdani family.22 They searched through
Salman's room and things, questioning family and friends, wanting to
know where he was. Asking these questions of parents who still slept in
the living room with the lights on, worried that they might not hear him
if Salman came home in the middle of the night.23 He never came home.
The harassment and the suspicion, however, continued to visit them
through continued government questioning. Then one day, police were
again knocking on the door. Salman's mother recalled:
It was 11:30 p.m. on the 20th of March, a Wednesday, when two police officers came. We still slept in the living room expecting Salman. My husband opened the door and they walked in. They did not
tell my husband to take a seat. They told my husband "Your son has
been identified through DNA. Your son is dead." And my husband
sat down on the floor. I told my husband, "They're lying." But I believed it. Salman worked as a DNA lab analyst, and he had said,
"Mom, DNA is a one in a billion chance to match." The next morning we told the family and went down to the medical examiner's office. They found the lower part of his body.
My brother called NYPD, and he asked "How does the department
handle the death of a cadet?" They said they'd handle it. Commissioner Kelly was the first to say he would come. I'm grateful that
[they] honored him as a son of New York. He got a wonderful salute.

He has become our role model now.24

Mayor Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly
showed up to honor Salman at his hero's funeral with 500 people in attendance.25 His body was found at the World Trade Center site along
with his medical bag and Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) identification.2 6 It seems that, as his parents suspected, Salman used his police
cadet and EMT identification cards to hitch a ride with a police or fire
truck into lower Manhattan where he died trying to help other people
27
who found themselves at the wrong place, at the wrong time.
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There is something here that doesn't make sense. One day, Mohammed Salman Hamdani is a suspected terrorist, the next he is recognized as a hero. What made him a suspect in the first place? The answer
reveals an incredibly frightening truth about post 9/11 America. Salman
was a suspect because he was a Muslim, because he was Pakistani, and
because he did well as a biochemistry major.2 8 That's it. And in post 9/11
America, that is all it takes.
Salman Hamdani's story is emblematic of the turn taken by this
country after 9/11. Innocent people's reputations and lives maligned and
even destroyed simply because they are from certain immigrant groups.
Since 9/11, a series of policies and practices embody this administration's commitment to fighting the "War on Terror" by attacking Arabs,
Muslims and South Asians. The following are a few highlights and examples of the broader attack on civil liberties that will affect every one of
US.
II. GOVERNMENT SWEEPS AND DETENTION

After September 11 th, Attorney General John Ashcroft held a series
of press conferences, updating the public on the administration's actions
to apprehend the terrorists responsible for September 11 th and prevent
any future attack. At a press briefing, Ashcroft described the government
campaign:
The Department of Justice is waging a deliberate campaign of arrest
and detention to protect American lives. We're removing suspected
terrorists who violate the law from our streets to prevent further terrorist attack. We believe we have al Qaeda membership in custody,
and we will use every constitutional tool to keep suspected terrorists
locked up.29

Indeed, the Department of Justice (DOJ) was waging a fierce campaign of preventative "arrest and detention."3 ° Contrary to the impression
given by Ashcroft, the results were doing nothing to protect American
lives. Instead of pulling criminals from America's streets, law enforcement questioned, harassed and arrested thousands of people who did
nothing more than come from a Muslim or Arab background. These were
not al-Qaeda members in custody, rather they were Arab and Muslim
immigrant men working at fast food restaurants, getting an education at
an American university, driving a cab - normal people. In government
conflation of religious and ethnic identity with criminal behavior, thou28. See id.
29. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Attorney General Provides Total Number of Federal
Criminal Charges and INS Detainees (Nov. 27, 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/
2001/agcrisisremarksl 1_27.htm (last visited May 25, 2004) (providing the total number of federal
criminal charges and INS detainees).
30. Id.
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sands of people found themselves at imminent risk of being labeled suspected terrorists and indefinitely losing their legal rights. FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) agents descended on Arab and
Muslim men in their homes, mosques and workplaces, often arresting
them simply on the basis of their ethnicity or religion and minor immigration violations. While the term is loaded, an immigration violation can
happen quite easily, and the civil violation is generally not connected to
any criminal activity. These "immigration violations" could be as minor
as not notifying the INS of a move within ten days or working at Dunkin'
Donuts on a tourist visa. In many instances, immigration violations occurred because of the notoriously slow backlog at the INS. Many Arab
and Muslim men married to U.S. citizens were still waiting for the INS
to process their forms when they were swept up, jailed and even deported
for "immigration violations." In some cases, there was no immigration
violation to speak of. Thousands of Arab and Muslim men disappeared
off the streets of their neighborhoods, never having committed a criminal
act.
Far from denying the use of visa violations as a predicate for arresting people absent criminal suspicion, Ashcroft proudly declared the U.S.
government strategy of using immigration law as a surrogate for criminal
behavior:
Robert Kennedy's Justice Department, it is said, would arrest mobsters for "spitting on the sidewalk" if it would help in the battle
against organized crime. It has been and will be the policy of this
Department of Justice to use the same aggressive arrest and detention
tactics in the war on terror.
Let the terrorists among us be warned: If you overstay your visa law, you
even by one day - we will arrest you. If you violate a local
31
will be put in jail and kept in custody as long as possible.
[It is] estimated [that] thousands were arrested on minor immigration violations, like overstaying tourist visas. Ashcroft continually reminded the American public the U.S. government was successfully removing suspected terrorists from our streets. Time and again, Ashcroft
held press briefings to update America on their progress. It started out
shortly after 9/11 when we were told that suspected terrorists were
picked up and in government custody. The number of "suspects" continued to increase until the first week of November 5, 2001 when the number announced by Ashcroft climbed to just under 1,200.32

Attorney General John Ashcroft, PreparedRemarks at the U.S. Mayors Conference (Oct.
31.
25, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks10_25.htm (last
visited May 25, 2004).
32. Dan Eggen & Susan Schmidt, Count of Released Detainees Is Hardto Pin Down, WASH.
POST, Nov. 6, 2001, at A10.
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The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was among the concerned voices, demanding to know who was being held, where and why.
In what became a hallmark of this administration, Ashcroft grew more
secretive. Not only would the Attorney General refuse to respond to
those concerns, he declined to release further information on the numbers
of people being detained. We often hear 1,200 bantered around as the
number of Arabs and Muslims detained after 9/11. That number is a fiction representing only the last number Ashcroft disclosed. Long after that
last disclosure, Muslim and Arab men continued to disappear off of
America's streets.
Due to information derived from family, friends and detainees themselves, immigration advocates estimate that the total number of Arabs
and Muslims detained in the post 9/11 sweeps falls at around several
thousand. It turns out that these men were not the terror suspects
Ashcroft described. Advocate groups rightly point out that those detained
in these sweeps were not publicly charged with a crime of terrorism;
however, they all have one thing in common - they are Arab and Muslim
men. Many with minor immigration violations, some whose status was
just fine.
Law enforcement stopped men with an Arab, Middle Eastern, South
Asian or Muslim appearance, detaining many. As the testimony of one
man shows, after September 1 th, that was, in and of itself, crime enough
to warrant arrest:
On September 11 th, 2001, I was driving my car and a cop pulled me
over. He asked me where I'm from. This is the first time a cop pulled
me over and asked me where I'm from before I talked. Usually they
ask after you talk. By the accent they are interested to know where
you are from. He was angry. He wants to know where I am from or
the reason to stop me is just to ask where I am from. So I said, "why
stop me?" He said, "I stop you for a red light. Give me your license."
I gave him the license. He went to his car. Two or three minutes later,
he comes back and says "where are you from?" I said, "I am from Israel." He said, "Arabic or Jewish?" I said, "What's the difference?"
He said, "It's a big difference."
I said, "I'm Arabic," and he said,
"you are under arrest." 33
Once detained, these men found themselves lost within a system
that no longer seemed to recognize basic due process rights. In June of
2003, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), the DOJ's internal
watchdog issued a report about the post 9/11 detentions that amounted to
a sweeping indictment of the Bush Administration. 34 The report con-

33.

PERSONS OF INTEREST. (The Documentary Campaign 2003).
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES: A REviEw OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN

34.
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firmed what the ACLU had been publicly alleging: Immigrants with no
connection to the terror attacks spent months in detention under conditions where they were denied basic rights. 35 The specific findings of the
report include:
* A "communications blackout" was imposed, preventing detainees
36
from calling anyone including attorneys, family and the press.
When the "blackout" ended, the Justice Department told prison officials "not to be37 in a hurry" to assist detainees in contacting attorneys
or consulates;

* The DOJ instituted an official "no bond" policy that prevented de38
tainees from access the justice system;

The government process for clearing immigrants of any connection
to the terrorist attacks was understaffed and not given "sufficient priority;" clearance
took an average of 80 days and in some cases more
39
than 200;
e

* The

OIG found that immigrants "who had no connection to terrorism" were
labeled suspects in an "indiscriminate and haphazard man,40
ner."
In a country that is supposed to be committed to liberty, these
abuses, reported by our own government, should shock every American.
They certainly astonished these immigrants. No one should be subject to
lengthy detentions without charge and certainly not subject to these described conditions.
Announced by Attorney General, John Ashcroft, the FBI commenced a massive program of finding and questioning Arabs. Between
September 1 lth and November 9th, 2001, the INS compiled a list of immigrants whose characteristics were similar to those of the 9/11 hijackers. Based on visa type, gender, age, sex and date of entry into the U.S,
initially 5,000 men found themselves targets of the questioning, then
3,000. Subsequently, Ashcroft initiated a program to question thousands
of Iraqi nationals and Iraqi-Americans. Absent any individualized suspicion, the FBI showed up, almost always unannounced, at the homes and
workplaces of men and women who had no connection to wrongdoing
and no useful information to offer up. While touted as voluntary, the
questioning tactics where often so aggressive and the presence of unexCONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS (2003), available at

http://www.usdoj.gov/oiglspecialI0306/full.pdf (last visited May 24, 2004).
35.
Id. at 195-97.
36.
Id. at 113.
37.
Id.
38.
Id. at 76-88.
39.
Id. at51.
40.
Id. at 70.
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pected federal authorities sufficiently intimidating, that the interviews
were inherently coercive. Most citizens and immigrants alike did not feel
free to refuse. Government authorities took great license in executing the
questioning, sometimes walking into a home, workplace or mosque to
question one person and taking names and extending interrogation to
everyone there.
The FBI and appropriate law enforcement agencies have not only
the right, but a responsibility to conduct appropriate investigation into
terrorism related activity. Discriminatory profiling, however, is neither a
legitimate investigative technique, nor is it a substitute for individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing. In determining who to interview, the government neglected to exhibit any belief, reasonable or otherwise, that the
people it sought to question possessed relevant knowledge of criminal
activity. Religion and ethnicity were the only identifying factors. Furthermore, many of the queries posed to those interrogated were not relevant to questions that should be asked of suspects or potential witnesses
to crimes.
Subjects of the interviews reported that authorities often used inappropriate intimidation tactics, questionable methods of interrogation and
delved into inappropriate subject matters. People were asked questions
such as:
How religious of a Muslim are you?
How many times a day do you pray?
What mosque do you attend?
How do you feel about the war in Afghanistan? The war in Iraq?
What do you think of U.S. foreign policy?
How do you feel about Israel?
Palestinian that you know. Name every Iraqi that you
Name 4every
1
know.

All of the information collected during these interviews was put into a
searchable federal database.
After hearing of some of the interviews, where possible, the ACLU
started offering free legal representation for those targeted for interviews.
When subjects informed the FBI that an attorney would be representing
them at the interview, an interesting thing started to happen - many
agents lost interest and canceled the interview. When the agents' cancellations developed into a pattern, some subjects did not tell the FBI that
41.

Taken from internal ACLU debriefings of interviews (on file with author).
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they would be accompanied by an attorney and just showed up to the
interview with their lawyers. Any sort of legitimate questioning should
be able to take place in front of an attorney and yet, time and again, FBI
agents cut short the questioning and walked out or canceled the interview, sometimes angrily. In one instance, an angry FBI agent told an
ACLU attorney that she had "wasted" his time. This worrying behavior,
on the part of federal officers, leads one to ask: What kind of questioning
does our government want to conduct if agents feel that they can't do it
in front of legal witnesses?
III. SPECIAL REGISTRATION
The harassment of Arabs and Muslims is not only carried out by
having federal agents go to them. In June of 2002, Ashcroft announced
the impending implementation of a program, the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), which would have Arabs and
Muslims go to the government. 42 One of the most highly publicized aspects of the program is the "Special Call-In Registration" which required
male nationals from 25 Muslim countries and North Korea to submit to
INS offices for questioning, fingerprinting and photographing.4 3 The
DOJ allotted specific time periods of weeks during which nonimmigrants from these designated countries were required to comply. 44
Those who did not appear at INS offices during the designated time period would presumptively lose their status, become "illegal" and risk
criminal jail penalties.45
It appeared, however, that the government was more interested in
making Arabs and Muslims subject to deportation than securing additional registration information. The government provided no individualized notice of the new requirements - no letters appeared mailboxes, no
phone calls made, and no press conference describing the requirements
held. Instead, the DOJ just issued an obscure notice published on the
federal registry so complicated that even attorneys experienced difficulty
in sorting out its meaning. 46 People who followed every infinitesimal rule
and detailed requirement since the moment they entered this country
went from good status to illegal status simply for not complying with a
requirement of which they had no knowledge. The program was publicly
42.
Attorney General John Ashcroft, Attorney General PreparedRemarks on the National
Security Entry-Exit Registration System (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/
speeches/2002/060502agpreparedremarks.htm (last visited May 24, 2004) [hereinafter Ashcroft June
6, 2002, Press Conference].
43. National Immigration Law Center, DOJ Expands "Call-In" Special Registration,Grants
Extensions of the Registration Periods for All Groups, IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS UPDATE (Feb. 21,
2003), available at http://www.nilc.org/imnlawpolicy/arrestdet/ad062.htm (last visited May 24,
2004).
44.
Id.
45.
Id.
46.
See, e.g., Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens From Designated Countries, 67
Fed. Reg. 67,766 (Nov. 6, 2002).
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offered as a tool to apprehend terrorists. 7 Yet, there is no terrorist who
will stand in line for hours to be fingerprinted, photographed and respond
honestly to questions like: "Are you a terrorist?"
Initially touted as a program that would register foreign visitors
from all nations, Ashcroft called an end to it as soon as most of the majority Muslim and Arab countries were registered. This came as no surprise. The administration's meager protests failed to veil Special Registration as a discriminatory program to register Arabs and Muslim South
Asians. The entire initiative represents horrifying backpedaling into discriminatory profiling. In the history of this country, indeed, in the history
of the world, subjecting people to special government regulations and
requirements on the basis of race, religion or ethnicity, is always looked
at in retrospect with extreme regret, shame and embarrassment. Not
once, have we looked back on an instance of this kind of profiling and
thought it was a good idea.
For many, the current period bears striking similarities to another
disgraceful period. In 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order
9066, giving the Secretary of War authority to intern over 110,000 Japanese-Americans, two-thirds of whom were U.S. citizens.48 As a country,
we have since apologized, paid $20,000 to each survivor in reparations
and yet appear not to have learned the fundamental lesson of not repeating past mistakes. 49 The Japanese-American community, particularly
horrified at government policies singling out Arabs and Muslims for discriminatory treatment, has voiced strong opposition to the discrimination
and solidarity with oppressed communities.
IV. WE ARE ALL AT RISK
Many people are complacent with some of the attacks on civil liberties because they are seen as affecting religious and ethnic minorities, not
the average person. James Baldwin voiced a beautiful truth, "we live in
an age in which silence is not only criminal but suicidal ....For, if they
take you in the morning, they will be coming for us that night."5 ° Often,
laws destructing civil liberties start with the most marginalized in our
society and eventually effect us all. We saw the progression in the use of
the "enemy combatant" status, as defined by President George W. Bush,
which originally only applied to non-citizens, but soon thereafter applied
to U.S. citizens as well. First Yasser Esam Hamdi, a U.S. citizen allegAshcroft June 6, 2002, Press Conference, supra note 42.
47.
Exec. Order No. 9066: Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas, 7
48.
Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903, 903 (codified as
49.
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1989-1989d (2000)). A listed purpose of the statute is to "make
restitution to those individuals of Japanese ancestry who were interned." Id. at 903.
James Baldwin, An Open Letter to My Sister, Angela Davis, in IF THEY COME IN THE
50.
MORNING: VOICES OF RESISTANCE 13 (Angela Yvonne Davis ed., 1971).
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edly captured in Afghanistan, 5' and then5 2Jose Padilla, another U.S. citizen arrested in Chicago's O'Hare airport.
Similarly, government scrutiny on America's airways is following
the same pattern. When government starts targeting people though circumstantial characteristics rather than criminally suspect behavior, it is a
short leap to encompassing increasingly wider groups of innocent people
in a web of undeserved suspicion.
The United States Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
recently announced plans to implement a program known as Computer
Assisted Passenger Prescreening Program II (CAPPS 11).53 This program
proposes to screen passenger profiles in order to identify national security risks to America's airways. 54 It would require the submission of personal information, which would be checked against other private facts in
government and third party databases.55 It would apply to all of the people who fly America's airways.56
In making travel reservations, airlines and travel agencies would
be required to collect the passenger's name, birth date, home phone
number and home address to create a Passenger Name Record (PNR).57
Included in the PNR are details such as the passenger's travel itinerary,
credit card information, hotel information, and emergency contact information.58 Some of the seemingly innocuous facts actually provide very
personal information that should have no bearing on a person's ability to
travel, but is easily subject to discriminatory scrutiny. For example, a
person's choice of Muslim or Kosher meal, included in the PNR,59 could
indicate their religion and lead to unfavorable ratings.
The information collected, forming the PNR, will be submitted to
both government and commercial databases which have data mined consumers' private information from various resources such as driving records, credit reports, real estate transactions and voter registration infor51.
See Brief for Petitioner, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (No. 03-6696) (arguing that detention of a United States citizen by the United States government as an enemy combatant
is unlawful).
52.
See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (United States citizen challenging
his detention by the United States government as an enemy combatant), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct.

1353 (2004).
53.
Press Release, United States Transportation Security Administration, TSA's CAPPS 11
Gives Equal Weight to Privacy Security (Mar. 11, 2003), at http://www.tsa.gov/public/display?
theme-44&content--09000519800193c2 (last visited May 25, 2004) [hereinafter TSA Press Release].

54.
55.

Id.
Id.

56.
See U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMrIrEES,
AVIATION SECURITY:
COMPUTER-ASSISTED PASSENGER PRESCREENING
SYSTEM FACES
SIGNIFICANT IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES 2 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04385.pdf (last visited May 24, 2004) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].

57.

Id.

58.

See id. at 6 n.8.

59.

See id. at 5.
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mation.60 These companies will compare the information from the PNR
with information that they have in their databases. 61 Red flags will be
raised if any information does not exactly match.6 2 Think of how easily
this could happen. Anyone who has recently moved and has not yet updated all of his or her credit companies, obtained a new driver's license,
or re-registered to vote will be marked as suspicious. Bias will attach
itself to those who have not established applicable records, resulting in
increased inspection of those with low incomes and young passengers all people whose conditions in no way reflect a threat to national security.
The data mining companies return the results of their information in
the form of a score to the TSA.63 TSA enters the particulars into the
CAPPS II scheme resulting in a "threat level" for each traveler, assigning
each person a color: red, yellow or green. 64 Red indicating that the person is a national security threat and should not be permitted to fly; yellow indicating that the person is a potential risk requiring scrutiny and
investigation; green applying to those who pose little risk and are permitted to fly. 65 The exact criteria by which the "risk level" will be determined are still secret and may never be revealed.66 Furthermore, once a
person is assigned a red or yellow, there is no procedure for him or her to
label was designated or how to remove themselves
find out why that
67
from those lists.

For those who can afford it, the TSA intends to create a "trusted
traveler" program.6 8 Those who can and wish to participate would submit
to comprehensive scrutiny, pay a fee, and in exchange, TSA will issue
them an identification card which will allow them to bypass any extra
security checks at the airport. 69 This leaves the airways vulnerable to
threats created via identity theft.
Although, for a period of time, Delta Airlines conducted a pilot program for CAPPS II, it has not yet been officially implemented industry
wide. 70 Congress indicated that CAPPS II would not be funded until the
60.
See id. at 6.
61.
Id.at7.
See id.
62.
63.
Id.
64.
American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Criticizes Plan to Go Forwardwith CAPPS I
Call Dragnet Profiling Approach Fake Security on the Cheap (Jan. 12, 2004), at http://www.
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program passed eight specified criteria. The General Accounting Office
(GAO), Congresses "regulatory arm," released an assessment of the program. According to the GAO, as of January 2004, the CAPPS II program
failed to meet all but one of the Congressional requirements for funding. 71 TSA is unsuccessful in: sufficiently testing CAPPS II for efficacy
and accuracy; adequately assessing the accuracy of information in databases used for CAPPS II; installing security measures to protect unauthorized access to travelers' personal data; establishing effective oversight of the system's use and operation; addressing privacy concerns; and
creating redress procedures for passengers to correct erroneous information. While Congress has made clear their intention that the program
should not proceed without correcting these problems, President Bush
indicates that the stated requirements are merely advisory recommendations, not requirements necessitating fulfillment.
CONCLUSION

From sweeping arrests and detentions absent probable cause of
criminal activity, to FBI questioning and Special Registration without
individualized suspicion, to data-mining programs that invade the integrity of our right to privacy without making us safer, we are quickly
changing as a nation. Targeting innocent immigrants is not the answer.
These and other measures do not make us safer as a country and they
destroy fundamental freedoms that have distinguished America. Almost
250 years ago, Benjamin Franklin said, "Those that give up essential
liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor
safety." There must be a response to terrorism, but the response must
recognize our ability to be both safe and free.
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